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An Afghan refugee looks out from her home in a refugee camp on the edge of Islamabad.
Photo by FAISAL MAHMOOD
Photo by FAISAL MAHMOOD
Afghanistan's security needs are getting worse, not better.
NATO announced at a summit in Istanbul at the end of June that it would expand its presence in Afghanistan, but this is unlikely to be enough.
In the past few weeks there has been serious discussion in the NGO community about the deteriorating situation, and questions are being asked about how much longer agencies can operate in this environment without putting their staff at further risk.
In 2003, 23 reconstruction workers -- NGO staff and employees of contractors engaged in reconstruction -- were killed in Afghanistan.
These were appalling enough numbers. But this year those numbers have nearly doubled in a little less than half the time.
This trend is likely to continue.
Following the murder of three foreigners and two Afghans from the aid group Médecins sans Frontières in the northwestern province of Baghdis on June 2, international agencies have suspended their work in the province for at least a month.
VIOLENCE SPREADING
Security constraints have stopped most NGO activity in the southern province of Kandahar since December 2003.
The killing of aid workers is tragic in its own right, but it is also symptomatic of the deepening insecurity facing all Afghans.
Most worrying is the fact that the violence appears to be spreading, with warlords and their militia operating with impunity in many parts of the country.
Reports of human rights abuses of civilians are increasing.
The initial euphoria people felt after the fall of the Taliban is being slowly eroded.
NATO agreed to increase its 6,500-strong peacekeeping force in Afghanistan to about 8,700 for elections in September, going down to 7,200 after the vote, although U.S. officials said they hoped more NATO troops would be agreed during July.
NATO, which took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003, plans to take control of two existing provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and three new ones.
It currently commands 11.
RESTRICTED MANDATE
However, the PRT mandate is restricted to intelligence-gathering, negotiation and small reconstruction projects in conjunction with the provincial governors.
ISAF troops and PRTs should focus on facilitating disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, countering narcotics, training the national police and army, and combating the increasing threat of insurgency.
ISAF’s deployment in Kabul has made the capital relatively secure and enabled the loya jirga -- a grand council of Afghan representatives -- to convene and approve the country’s constitution.
Outside Kabul, however, the situation is far less stable.
The process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is far behind schedule.
To date, only just over 6,000 combatants have been disarmed; and most of these are foot soldiers, rather than mid- or high-level commanders, so the impact is limited.
Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, the Canadian in command of ISAF, was quoted in a recent article as saying: "The DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) process is coming to a spluttering end."
DEMOBILISATION IS KEY
Yet successful DDR is a key element to helping restore a secure environment.
Ultimately, the security of Afghanistan lies in the hands of Afghan security structures, including a well-trained police and national army.
But these institutions are far from ready to fulfill this task alone.
Nor are they likely to be able to do so unless NATO significantly scales up its training and support for them.
Last week, 54 NGOs called upon NATO member states to ensure that NATO troops in Afghanistan were located, mandated and resourced to confront the immediate security threats faced by Afghans, to help the disarmament process and to build the capacity of Afghan national security forces in the long term.
The reluctance of NATO member states to seriously engage in Afghanistan seems to stem primarily from consideration of the cost of doing so.
But the real question NATO states should be considering is what the cost of failure might be.
Any views expressed in this article are those of the writer and not of Reuters.
