NEWSDESK
Gaza/Jerusalem/Brussels, 19 March 2008: The policy of squeezing Gaza and isolating Hamas has not worked. A new approach is needed if violence is to end and a viable peace process is to be promoted.
Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, analyses the situation in the Strip today and explores the options facing Israel, the Palestinians and the international community. Though difficult, a different way forward is imaginable: a mutual ceasefire in Gaza; a credible international effort to prevent arms smuggling from Egypt into Gaza; and an opening of Gaza’s border crossings to alleviate Palestinian suffering. At the same time, efforts toward intra-Palestinian reconciliation are needed.
“The policy of isolating Hamas and Gaza is bankrupt and, by all conceivable measures, has backfired”, says Nicolas Pelham, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst in Jerusalem. “The population’s suffering has only increased its dependence on its rulers”.
Since Hamas assumed full control of Gaza in June 2007, the already tight sanctions imposed following its January 2006 electoral victory have been tightened further. Israel curtailed cross-border traffic. The West Bank-based Palestinian Authority has done its part to cut off Gaza and prevent the normal functioning of government. The international community – the Arab world included – has been at best passive.
If trends continue, the worst is imaginable: increased firing of rockets against Israeli towns and cities as well as the resumption of bombings and attacks inside Israel; intensified Israeli military incursions, targeted assassinations and attacks on key installations; the collapse of the peace process; the discrediting of pragmatic Palestinian leaders; and, potentially, the conflict’s spread to the West Bank or Lebanon.
“The worst is not yet inevitable”, says Robert Malley, Director of Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program. “But avoiding it depends on Fatah and Hamas beginning the process of reconciliation; a ceasefire agreement that allows Gazans and Israelis near the border to pursue normal lives; and the international community at last playing a constructive part in encouraging the parties to achieve these goals”.
The executive summary and recommendations are available in Arabic and in Hebrew
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The policy of isolating Hamas and sanctioning Gaza is bankrupt and, by all conceivable measures, has backfired. Violence is rising, harming both Gazans and Israelis. Economic conditions are ruinous, generating anger and despair. The credibility of President Mahmoud Abbas and other pragmatists has been further damaged. The peace process is at a standstill. Meanwhile, Hamas’s hold on Gaza, purportedly the policy’s principal target, has been consolidated. Various actors, apparently acknowledging the long-term unsustainability of the status quo, are weighing options. Worried at Hamas’s growing military arsenal, Israel is considering a more ambitious and bloody military operation. But along with others, it also is tiptoeing around another, wiser course that involves a mutual ceasefire, international efforts to prevent weapons smuggling and an opening of Gaza’s crossings and requires compromise by all concerned. Gaza’s fate and the future of the peace process hang in the balance.
Since Hamas assumed full control of Gaza in June 2007, the already-tight sanctions imposed following its January 2006 electoral victory have been tightened further. Israel curtailed cross-border traffic, pointing to the absurdity of providing goods to an entity whose rulers fire rockets at its citizens. The West Bank-based Palestinian Authority, seeking to undermine Hamas’s standing, has also done its part to cut off Gaza and prevent normal functioning of government; feeble protests aside, the international community (Arab world included) has been at best passive.
The logic behind the policy was to demonstrate to Palestinians that Hamas could not deliver and so ought to be cast aside. The hope was that the West Bank, buoyed by economic growth, a loosening of Israeli security measures and a revived peace process, would be an attractive counter-model. On both counts, the theory has fallen short. Crisis Group’s extensive field work in Gaza shows that the Islamist movement has come close to establishing an effective monopoly on the use of force and has a near-monopoly on open political activity. It has refashioned the legal and legislative systems and enjoys freer rein to shape society through management of the health, education and religious sectors.
Those intending to undermine Hamas have instead given it an assist. Persons who support current policy point out that Gazans are turning against the Islamists. There is real distress at economic hardships and anger at the Islamists’ brutal behaviour. Hamas’s harsh tactics, recourse to violence and curbing of the media and independent activity undoubtedly have generated resentment, disillusionment and fear among many who voted for the Islamists.
But that is only half the story. The flip side of isolation has been the Islamists’ ability to rule largely unimpeded. By boycotting the security, judicial and other government sectors and curtailing administrative links with the Hamas government, President Abbas’s Palestinian Authority (PA) created a vacuum Hamas filled. The withdrawal of the international community has reduced its leverage. Closure of the crossings has caused the private sector to wither, weakening a constituency traditionally loyal to the PA. Economic punishment designed to hurt the rulers has hurt the ruled. Hamas finds ways to finance its government and can invoke the siege to justify its more ruthless practices. The situation may be catastrophic but, from Hamas’s perspective, it is far from desperate. Far less popular regimes have survived more onerous conditions. Moreover, Hamas has had successes. Its new security force gradually restored order as militiamen curbed gunfire and kinsmen reduced inter-clan blood feuds. Criminal activity and mafia feuding have been sharply curbed.
The questions now are familiar: whether to keep pressure on Hamas in the hope of undermining it but at the risk of an explosion; whether to apply heavier, but riskier military force; or whether to try to stabilise the situation by engaging Hamas, opening up Gaza and reaching a ceasefire at the price of providing the Islamists with greater international recognition. The first two options have a rationale: any step toward Hamas and loosening of the sanctions could further entrench its position in Gaza; it could exploit a ceasefire to bolster its forces.
But the counter-arguments are more powerful. Sanctions and military pressure have strengthened Hamas’s hold. To the extent the movement has lost some popularity, the attempt to enfeeble it by squeezing Gaza arguably is working, but the success is meaningless. Hamas’s losses are not Fatah’s gains; Gazans blame Hamas for being unable to end the siege but also blame Israel for imposing it, the West for supporting it and Fatah for acquiescing in it. Military talk empowers Hamas’s more militant, armed elements and boosts the movement’s standing. Poverty and hopelessness boost the appeal of jihadi groups, particularly among under-sixteen Gazans –- half the population.
Hamas has proved skilful at rewriting the rules through ballots, bullets or breach of the siege. The more pressure on it intensifies and the more polarised the intra-Palestinian conflict becomes, the more it will be tempted to derail negotiations between President Abbas and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. It has already shown it can disrupt peace talks. Should violence escalate, how long will it be before whatever there is of the peace process collapses? The gravest threat to diplomacy comes not when Hamas has something to gain, but when it concludes it has nothing to lose.
The alternative is not easy. Israel has legitimate concerns about how Hamas might use a ceasefire, as does the PA about how a shift of course would affect its credibility. Hamas will not accept a ceasefire if it remains isolated and Gaza under siege. To address these competing interests, a ceasefire should entail reciprocal commitments to stop all attacks from and against Gaza; an opening of the crossings that alleviates Palestinian suffering in Gaza; and the international community’s participation in a credible monitoring effort to prevent smuggling from Egypt into Gaza.
The status quo is not tenable. Israel cannot accept to see its citizens threatened by continued rocket fire. Hamas is unlikely to sit idly by as Gaza is choked. If trends continue, the worst is imaginable: increased firing of rockets against Israeli towns and cities, as well as the resumption of bombings and attacks inside Israel; intensified Israeli military incursions, assassinations and attacks on key installations; the collapse of the peace process, discrediting of pragmatic Palestinian leaders and, potentially, the conflict’s spread to the West Bank or Lebanon.
The worst is not yet inevitable but avoiding it depends on Fatah and Hamas beginning reconciliation; a ceasefire agreement that lifts the siege on Gaza and allows Gazans and Israelis near the border to pursue normal lives; and the international community at last playing a constructive part in encouraging the parties to achieve these goals.
A subsequent Crisis Group report will analyse the situation in the West Bank.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in Gaza, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) Presidency and Fayyad Government:
1. Prepare for a dialogue aiming at national reconciliation and take immediate measures to ease tension and rebuild trust, such as
(a) ceasing all media attacks and incitement;
(b) ceasing harassment and detention of Fatah members in the Gaza Strip and of Hamas members in the West Bank; and
(c) agreeing on gestures toward the restitution of symbols of Palestinian unity in the Gaza Strip, including the evacuation by Hamas of the presidential office and other PA headquarters.
2. Pending a national reconciliation agreement, take steps to improve governance in Gaza and alleviate the suffering of its residents, including:
(a) for the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip:
i. enable public institutions to function free of interference from armed groups and without discrimination against PA civil servants or civil police officers, including those who participated in strikes following the June 2007 takeover;
ii. uphold the independence of the judiciary, reinstate public attorneys who were discharged or prevented from performing their duties and comply with legal procedures for detention, arrest and prosecution;
iii. control activities of its armed militants and organisations, restrain them from interfering in citizens’ daily lives and cease infringement of freedom of association, expression and peaceful political activities; and
iv. ensure the impartial delivery of services;
(b) for the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah:
i. encourage PA civil servants and other public sector employees, including judges, doctors and civil police, to resume full operational duties;
ii. maintain and, where necessary, reinstate salary payments to civil servants and other public sector employees;
iii. continue payment of utilities and basic services in the Gaza Strip; and
iv. press for and where possible facilitate the opening of crossings under arrangements described below.
To the Governments of Israel and Hamas:
3. Halt, immediately and for fifteen days, all attacks by Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip against Israel and all Israeli attacks against the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip to give President Abbas and/or Egyptian mediators time to negotiate understandings allowing a sustained ceasefire that would entail:
(a) commitment by Hamas to abstain from attacking any target in Israel and to ensure compliance by other factions and commitment by Israel to abstain from attacking any target in the Gaza Strip;
(b) commitment by Hamas to cooperate on preventing smuggling across Gaza’s borders;
(c) enhanced Egyptian efforts, in coordination with regional and international actors, to prevent smuggling; and
(d) third-party monitors inside Gaza and along its borders with Israel and Egypt, mandated to supervise the parties’ compliance with their commitments.
To the Governments of Israel and Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas:
4. Agree on modalities allowing regular and continued opening of Gaza’s crossings with Israel and Egypt, including:
(a) as immediate measures:
i. permit rapid transit of people in need of medical care, as well as movement of students, merchants and individuals who live in third countries;
ii. increase the opening days and hours of Israeli crossings handling commercial traffic, broadening the list of allowed items, restoring fuel and energy supplies to their pre-June 2007 level and permitting exports of commercial supplies; and
iii. accept third-party presence, such as UN personnel or private contractors, to help manage crossings and interface between Israel and Hamas;
(b) as a longer-term solution:
i. agree on return of PA border authorities to Gaza’s crossings on the basis of existing regulations;
ii. agree on return of PA forces inside and in the immediate perimeter of the crossings and redeployment of Hamas forces away from the crossings, with coordination between the two;
iii. agree on resumption of European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) operations at Rafah without interference; and
iv. permit use of revenues collected at the crossings to finance Gaza’s public expenditures, such as utilities, infrastructure maintenance and running costs of institutions, such as hospitals, schools and ministries.
To Members of the Quartet (the U.S., European Union (EU), Russian Federation and UN), Egypt and Members of the League of Arab States:
5. Adopt unambiguously the goal of influencing Hamas’s conduct rather than defeating it.
6. Identify needs in and increase economic assistance to the Gaza Strip.
7. Pressure all relevant parties to reach agreement on opening the crossings, a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange.
8. Establish a Quartet presence in Gaza to monitor the situation, ensure impartial delivery of international assistance, promote economic recovery and oversee opening of crossings.
9. Revive Arab efforts to achieve reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, entailing, inter alia, endorsement of the Arab peace initiative; a mandate for the PLO Chairman to negotiate with Israel; integration of Hamas and Islamic Jihad into a reformed PLO; and reform of the security services so that militias and other factional forces can be integrated into a more unified, coherent and disciplined force.
Gaza/Jerusalem/Brussels, 19 March 2008
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