By Nidal al-Mughrabi and Dan Williams GAZA/TEL AVIV, Feb 5 (Reuters) - A day on, there is scant trace of the air strike that killed Amer Qarmout -- a small crater in the tarmac, some dusty, bloodied shreds of clothing, but no debris from the top-secret Israeli guided missile used. Had the Palestinian rocket crew commander taken one or two steps away in the seconds before impact he might have escaped death, like two of his comrades who were wounded by the attack. As Israel escalates its aerial campaign against militants in the congested Gaza Strip, it is employing hi-tech tactics designed to reduce the damage and the number of bystanders hurt, as well as fending off foreign criticism. "There is a trend in terms of the very dramatic improvement in hitting the terrorists and not non-combatants," a senior air force commander said. The air force says its strikes now cause around one civilian casualty for every 20 militants killed or wounded, compared to a roughly 1-to-1 ratio when the practice was introduced in 2002. Palestinian authorities and Israel's B'Tselem human rights group dispute that, putting the ratio at around one civilian for every three or four militants. Israeli troops and tanks have also regularly mounted deadly ground raids into Gaza. But there is consensus that Israeli methods are evolving. In 2002 Israel killed Hamas military commander Salah Shehada by dropping a one-tonne bob on his home. The death of 14 other people in that attack drew a wave of international censure. Whereas U.S.-supplied Hellfire anti-tank missiles launched from combat helicopter would once spray shrapnel and molten metal over crowded streets, for example, now the strikes are generally at night and employ ordnance of such low explosive power that cars that are hit often remain largely intact. The air force commander said operational planners have their pick of classified Israeli-made missiles with warheads that cause small and relatively contained blasts. "The impact is only on the target," he said, but added that sometimes munitions in militants' vehicles go off unexpectedly, causing "secondary" casualties that cannot be foreseen. SPIES AND CELLPHONES Yet what most decides whether an air strike will draw innocent blood is intelligence data -- a pilot's knowledge that only the target in his or her sights will be hit. Israel, which pulled out of Gaza in 2005 after 38 years of occupation, still has an extensive spy network and Palestinians believe its missiles can home in on cellphones used by wanted men after electronic eavesdroppers identify their voices. Some top Palestinian faction leaders are known to avoid giving recorded interviews as a precaution. "I think the intel (on Gaza) is getting better and better," the Israeli air force commander said without elaborating. He said the most valuable information is in real time -- images of the ground fed to the Israeli war room by surveillance drones. Foreign analysts also believe some Israeli missiles have mounted cameras that allow pilots to "see" what is to be hit. The air force commander said he knew of many air strikes that were aborted in the final seconds, and the missile diverted safely out to sea, when bystanders were deemed to be in danger. Once, "we were tracking a car and the missile was in the air and just then along the road we saw a group of kids playing, and we cancelled it while the missile was in the air", he said. Israel says it reserves the right to carry out attacks that will almost certainly hurt non-combatants if the target is believed to be a sufficiently grave security threat. But Khalil Abu Shammala, director of the Gaza-based Ad-Dameer Association for Human Rights, dismissed the Israeli air force statistics, describing them as "propaganda aimed at deflecting international criticism of its attacks on civilians". (Writing by Dan Williams, Editing by Dominic Evans)
A Palestinian man reacts after hearing that eight Hamas militants were killed in an Israeli airstrike in the southern Gaza Strip February 5, 2008. Israeli forces killed at least eight Hamas ...
