By David Morgan WASHINGTON, Jan 23 (Reuters) - The Bush administration came under fire on Tuesday for its failure to produce a key intelligence report that casts doubt on whether the Iraqi government is capable of taking steps to ensure the success of President George W. Bush's strategy. The classified document, known as a national intelligence estimate, would represent the 16-agency espionage community's consensus views on the stability of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government and prospects for controlling sectarian violence in Iraq. U.S. intelligence chief John Negroponte's office was ordered by Congress to produce the document in late September, but is not expected to do so until after the Senate takes up two measures opposing Bush's plan to send another 21,500 troops to Iraq to try to quell the violence. "Here we are with the president's program laid down, about to go into a considerable debate which I think is important for the nation, and yet this document is continued to be worked on," Republican Sen. John Warner of Virginia said at a hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Thomas Fingar, Negroponte's deputy for intelligence analysis and chairman of the National Intelligence Council, said the new document's conclusions have already been made available in other reports. "The very short hand is that it will be very difficult for the Maliki government to do this, but not impossible," Fingar told the Senate panel. "We judge that Maliki does not wish to fail in his role. He does not wish to preside over the disintegration of Iraq. He has some but not all the obvious requirements for success," Fingar said. "The judgment is that gains in stability could open a window for gains in reconciliation among, between sectarian groups." Fingar admitted that the intelligence document was late because of demands on analysts who deal with Iraq. He said it was expected to be completed by month's end. "That's not acceptable," Sen. Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, told Fingar and five other officials from Negroponte's office who appeared before the panel. "To have maximum value, the intelligence that's furnished has got to be made available in a timely way," he said. Fingar said the intelligence community deliberately took its time with the document to avoid the fate of a problem-plagued 2002 Iraq intelligence estimate. That estimate helped justify Bush's decision to invade Iraq by claiming that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. No such weapons were ever found and the estimate was found to have been based on faulty intelligence.
